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Abstract
The issue of income inequality occupies a prominent position in the
research agenda of academic and policy circles alike, especially after the
crisis of 2008, due to its potential causal link with the development of
credit bubbles and therefore the emergence of financial crises. This pa-
per examines the long-run effect of income inequality on consumption,
consumer credit and non-performing loans through the means of a data-
driven agent-based model. The data-driven nature of the model enhances
its ability to match historical series and thus makes it suitable for policy
simulations tailored for specific economies. The analysis indicates that
higher income inequality has a detrimental impact on consumption and is
associated with lower volumes of consumer credit. However, the ratio of
non-performing loans as a share of total loans seems to be independent of
income inequality.
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1 Introduction
The central theme of this paper is the effect of inequality in the distribution
of income on aggregate macroeconomic and financial variables. At its core is
essentially a thought experiment attempting to answer the question: How would
the initial level of income inequality affect aggregate consumption, consumer
credit and non-performing loans of an economic system which would otherwise
follow a specific historical scenario?
The issue of inequality and the effects of its various manifestations -such as
income, wealth or consumption- on both developing and developed countries has
attracted the attention of academia and policy makers alike1, especially after
the financial crisis of 2008, with several studies documenting significant increases
in the skewness and kurtosis of income and wealth distributions over the past
three decades (e.g. Piketty and Saez (2003, 2006), Atkinson and Morelli (2011)).
However, this topic might not have risen to such prominent position within the
economics profession if it weren’t for the potential causal links between rising
inequality and financial crises.
The rationale behind this cause and effect relationship begins with house-
holds with insufficient financial resources resorting to borrowing in order to
maintain their living standards. In turn, the excess leverage creates unsustain-
able credit growth which subsequently ends with a credit bubble bust. One of
the consequences of the latter is the amplification of pre-existing inequalities
thus resulting in a positive feedback loop between inequality and crises. For a
review of the recent literature on the complex interconnections between inequal-
ity, leverage and crises the reader is referred to the excellent work of Bazillier
and He´ricourt (2017) and references therein.
Interestingly, empirical literature on the first, fundamental element of the
hypothesized underlying mechanism linking higher inequality with increased
volumes of credit is not conclusive. Results range from suggesting a positive
(Christen and Morgan, 2005; Perugini et al., 2015), negative (Coibion et al.,
2014) or even non-significant (Bordo and Meissner, 2012) relationship. On the
contrary, theoretical works display a higher consensus regarding the sign and
the direction of the aforementioned relationship. Contributions from the DSGE
literature (Iacoviello, 2008; Kumhof et al., 2015) show how increased inequality
can create highly indebted, low-income households which eventually results in
a fragile economy, prone to financial and real crises.
Another strand of literature employs agent-based models (ABM)2 to explore
the economic effects of various inequality forms such as income (Cardaci and
Saraceno, 2015; Dosi et al., 2013, 2015, 2016; Palagi et al., 2017), wealth (Russo
et al., 2016) or both (Caiani et al., 2017) and indeed finds that higher inequality
has detrimental macroeconomic effects, impeding growth and increasing the
1For the latter see Amaral (2017), Colciago et al. (2018) or Ampudia et al. (2018) and
references therein for studies on the relationship between central bank policies and inequality.
2For an elaborate exposition of this modelling approach in macroeconomics see Dawid and
Delli Gatti (2018) while for its differences with DSGE models see Fagiolo and Roventini (2017)
and references therein.
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probability of a crisis occurring.
The bottom-up nature of ABM makes this approach flexible and appropriate
to examine distributional questions, hence it will be followed in this study.
However, contrary to the aforementioned works where fully-fledged models are
developed with all interactions among agents being endogenously determined,
in this paper certain agents are not explicitly modelled. Instead, for simplicity,
their interactions with the other agents enter the model exogenously, as input
from historical data3 (Hassan et al., 2010).
This modelling choice allows to simplify the interaction structure among
agents to a large extent by forcing them to follow as closely as possible the
actual evolution of several key variables. This specific approach has two benefits.
Firstly, it enables the targeted examination of the effect of a single parameter,
namely income inequality, on the variables under study. Secondly, it permits
to bring the model closer to the data than the current standard in the ABM
literature in economics which is the replication of empirical regularities.4 By
doing so, the empirical validation of the model extends beyond matching stylized
facts between simulated and actual data, to directly comparing the evolution
of the historical with the artificially generated time series. This enables to use
the model for policy simulations referring to specific economies, in addition to
answering the core question on the impact of the initial level of income inequality
on macro-financial variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 the model’s
structure is described in detail. Agents’ behavioural rules and interactions in
the various markets are elaborated, including a crucial element which is their
expectations formation mechanism. Section 3 initially describes the input data
used and presents the outcome of model’s validation before proceeding with
the presentation and discussion of the simulation results. Finally, section 4
concludes exploring potential uses and extensions of the model.
2 The model
This section provides a description of the modelling properties which charac-
terise the agent-based, macroeconomic model under development. The most
elaborate agents of the economic system are households (h = 1, 2, ...,H) and
banks, represented as an all-encompassing banking sector agent. For the re-
maining agents such as firms, the central bank and the government historical
data are used to determine the evolution of their interactions with the former
3Thus, it is closely related to the ”history-friendly” approach to calibration identified by
Fagiolo et al. (2007).
4The vast majority of the respective literature has focused on the adequate replication of
empirical stylized facts and regularities (Fagiolo et al., 2017). Two of the most successful
attempts so far showing a good fit between artificial time series from an ABM and the actual
ones have been by Geanakoplos et al. (2012) and Delli Gatti et al. (2011). In the former
the authors use data from 2.2 million households to model the housing market of the greater
Washington, DC area while in the latter the authors use data for 25,000 Italian firms to
validate their macroeconomic ABM.
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agents in the respective markets.
The economic system evolves over t = 1, 2, ..., T time periods, with T being
determined by the time range of the historical data used. As follows from the
focus of agents’ development, the most detailed market in which they interact is
the credit market. All other markets are passive and their evolution is governed
by that of the historical series.
Households are boundedly rational and simple heuristics control their be-
haviour. If their financial position allows them, they consume a proportion of
their expected income and past deposits in each period and save any remaining
resources. Otherwise, in case they are in financial distress, they consume a min-
imum amount or they ask for credit if their financial position is sound. A key
role in credit demand is played by the households’ income expectations forma-
tion mechanism. Based on the heuristics switching model (HSM) of Anufriev
and Hommes (2012a,b), households follow simple linear, adaptive and trend ex-
tracting rules to form their expectations. In addition, their chosen rule is not
fixed but they update their selection from a small pool of expectation heuris-
tics according to their past performance. As pointed out by De Grauwe and
Macchiarelli (De Grauwe and Macchiarelli, 2015) it is indeed rational to utilize
simple forecasting heuristics and monitor their performance given one’s limited
cognitive capabilities.
On the supply-side of credit, the bank bases its decision to provide credit
on its available deposits and a time-variant measure proxying its risk tolerance,
namely the debt service to income ratio (DSTI).
Finally, the labour market is entirely data-driven. The monthly evolution of
households’ income and their employment status enter the model as input from
historical data. Households’ income, there being no explicitly modelled gov-
ernment agent and thus no taxes, corresponds to their disposable income. For
brevity, in the remainder of the paper income will be used to refer to disposable
income. Unemployed households receive an unemployment benefit from the gov-
ernment which is assumed to coincide with the subsistence consumption level.
It should be noted that the only interaction between the implicit government
agent and households is through the unemployment benefit.
In the following subsections are described the initialization of the simulation,
the timeline of events taking place at each period and subsequently the agents
and their interactions in the respective markets.
2.1 Initialization
One of the prerequisites for a micro-founded ABM is that agents’ initial con-
ditions should be initialized with actual data (Delli Gatti et al., 2011). At the
beginning of the simulation each household is endowed with a monthly income5
drawn from a gamma distribution, Γ(α, 1/λ) with α and λ the shape and scale
5Computationally, the algorithm described in Hamill and Gilbert (2015) is used to allocate
households’ income.
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parameters respectively.6 By adjusting the shape and scale one can specify the
distribution so that it has the same average and minimum values as well as the
same degree of inequality as the historical distribution. It should be noted that,
for a given α, the smaller the λ the less skewed the distribution, i.e. the lower
the inequality.
The initialization of the unemployment rate is also based on its historical
figures at the start of the simulation. According to these, a number of households
is chosen randomly and their income is fixed at the level of the unemployment
dole which permits them to maintain the minimum consumption level required
to survive.
After the initialization of income and unemployment all growth rates are set
to zero and the simulation is executed for a burn-in period of N time steps,
after which the system is assumed to have reached its equilibrium. After that
period the historical data enter into the model and its output is recorded.
2.2 Sequence of events
The sequence of events in every period of the simulation is the following:
1. Historical series for income and unemployment growth as well as loan and
deposit interest rates are updated.
2. The bank sets its DSTI level.
3. Households collect the interest from any deposits they have placed at the
bank.
4. Employed households receive their monthly income based on the afore-
mentioned historical growth rates.
5. The historical evolution of unemployment determines households’ employ-
ment status.
6. Households update their income expectations.
7. Households address their financial obligations and determine their desired
consumption.
8. Households with insufficient own financial resources to meet their desired
consumption ask for credit.
9. The bank calculates and offers the maximum amount of credit it can to a
household given its DSTI and the income of the latter.
10. Households meet their desired consumption or a fraction of it in case they
are financially constrained and deposit any remaining income.
6Empirical studies show that from the family of two-parameter distributions, gamma dis-
tribution fits income data reasonably well in a variety of countries and different periods in
time (Bandourian et al., 2002).
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2.3 Agent and market description
This subsection provides a detailed description of the agents, their behavioural
rules and interactions in the various markets.
2.3.1 Households
Households’ consumption decisions crucially depend on their financial position
and in particular their ability to consume the minimum amount which ensures
their survival. This is summarized in the following rule:
Cdh,t =
{
Cmin,t, Ih,t +Dh,t−1 < LPh,t + Cmin,t
max{αy · Ieh,t+1 + αw ·Dh,t−1, Cmin,t}, Ih,t +Dh,t−1 ≥ LPh,t + Cmin,t
(1)
with 0 < αw < αy < 1 the marginal propensities to consume out of wealth
and income respectively.
Those households whose sum of current income (Ih,t) and past deposits
(Dh,t−1) does not suffice for them to consume the minimum amount (Cmin,t)
and meet their monthly loan payment (LPh,t), set their desired consumption
(Cdh,t) to that of the subsistence level. It follows that they don’t service any
loans they might have for as long as these conditions remain. On the contrary,
households who can afford minimum consumption and service their loan they do
so and set their desired consumption as the largest element between a percentage
of their expected income (Ieh,t+1) and past deposits and Cmin,t.
The specific Modigliani (Modigliani and Brumberg, 1954) consumption func-
tion of the financially sound households in Equation (1) is thoroughly discussed
in Godley and Lavoie (2016) and is widely used by the respective ABM litera-
ture (Delli Gatti and Desiderio, 2015; Gualdi et al., 2015; Ricetti et al., 2013;
Riccetti et al., 2015; Assenza et al., 2015; Caiani et al., 2016; Russo et al.,
2016; Gurgone et al., 2018; Meijers et al., 2018, among others).7 Although such
rule may seem overly simple, Allen and Carroll (2001) argue that linear, rule-
of-thumb consumption functions can indeed provide a good approximation of
consumption functions -such as the one from buffer stock theory- derived as
solutions to utility maximization problems. One interesting implication of the
linear consumption function of Equation (1) is that households have a target
wealth to income ratio of (1−αy)/αw. Therefore, in an attempt to reach it, they
save when their target level of wealth is higher than the realized one (Godley
and Lavoie, 2016).
In case a household’s remaining income and deposits (i.e. after servicing its
loan) is enough to meet its desired level of consumption, it uses its own financial
resources (withdrawing from its deposits if need be) to satisfy it. Otherwise
it asks for consumer credit from the bank. A household asking for credit is
assumed to spend any amount granted along with all of its income plus deposits
7For more examples of consumption functions used in various macroeconomic ABMs the
reader is referred to the works of Haldane and Turrell (2018) and Dawid and Delli Gatti (2018)
and references therein.
6
to satisfy its desired consumption. Thus, it may consume less or more than
desired depending on the supplied credit.
Finally, after consumption plans are executed, any income remaining is de-
posited at the bank at the given overnight deposit interest rate.
2.3.2 Expectations formation
Due to the pivotal role expectations play in credit demand in the model, their
formation mechanism merits an elaborate description.
Research on expectations formation has identified three key facts regarding
individuals’ behaviour:
• Expectations are heterogeneous among individuals.
• Individuals use simple linear (adaptive and trend extrapolating) heuristics
to form their expectations.
• Individuals switch among heuristics.
These findings are supported by a large number of studies using both survey
data (Mankiw et al., 2003; Branch, 2004; Pfajfar and Santoro, 2010) and in
controlled experiments (Hommes et al., 2004, 2008; Haruvy et al., 2007; Pfajfar
and Zˇakelj, 2016; Assenza et al., 2011).
Following the seminal papers by Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), the works
of Anufriev and Hommes (2012a,b) have established that individual and aggre-
gate experimental data can be adequately described by a heuristics switching
model (HSM).
In particular, the HSM rests on four simple heuristics, evaluated on the
basis of their performance and selected according to a discrete choice model
with asynchronous updating (Diks and Van Der Weide, 2005; Hommes et al.,
2005).
The expectations heuristics for a generic variable yt are the following:
Weak trend following rule (WTR):
yewtr,t = yt−1 + ωwtr · (yt−1 − yt−2) (2)
Strong trend following rule (STR):
yestr,t = yt−1 + ωstr · (yt−1 − yt−2) (3)
Adaptive expectations rule (ADA):
yeada,t = y
e
t−1 + ωada · (yt−1 − yet−1) (4)
Learning anchoring and adjustment rule (LAA):
yelaa,t =
yavt−1 + yt−1
2
+ (yt−1 − yt−2) (5)
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, where yavt−1 =
1
t
∑j=t−1
j=0 yj
The first two heuristics (WTR and STR) represent a trend-following rule
which extrapolates the latest change from the most recent observation of y.
Their difference is in how strong the reaction to past changes is with ωstr > ωwtr.
Expectations under the adaptive rule (ADA) are formed as a weighted average
of the current observation and its expected value and, finally, the LAA heuristic
is a slightly more complicated trend-following rule which extrapolates the last
observed change from an anchor (hence its name). The latter is the average
between the last observed value of y and the mean of its past values (Anufriev
and Hommes, 2012a,b).
The performance measure of heuristic i is:
Ui,t−1 = −(yt−1 − yei,t−1)2 + ηUi,t−2 (6)
The parameter η ∈ [0, 1] denotes the strength of households’ memory, or put
differently, the relative weight they assign to past errors. In the case of η = 0,
past performance is completely forgotten and only current one matters. For
every other value of η ∈ (0, 1] all past prediction errors are taken into account.
Households employ a specific expectations heuristic with probability ni,t,
which is updated in every period accordingly:
ni,t = δni,t−1 + (1− δ) exp(βUi,t−1)∑4
i=1 exp(βUi,t−1)
(7)
The parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] captures households’ willingness to switch among
heuristics (i.e. their persistence) and the parameter β ≥ 0 measures the in-
tensity of choice representing households’ sensitivity to differences in heuristic
performance.
In the model, the values of every parameter associated with the HSM are
set according to the ones identified by Anufriev and Hommes (2012a,b) and are
reported in Table 4.
2.3.3 Bank
The banking sector is represented by a single agent who supplies credit to house-
holds at a monthly interest rate of rLt % and accepts their deposits paying them
an interest of rDt % per month. Instead of modelling the evolution of interest
rates explicitly (e.g. reacting to a central bank’s policy rate and borrowers’ risk
for the former and deposit demand for the latter), they are both set according
to the actual figures of the applied historical scenario.
The key parameter that determines credit supply is DSTI ratio, defined
as the sum of interest payments plus amortisations divided by the borrower’s
monthly income. Given that accurate data on the applied level of DSTI ratio
by the banking sector for consumer loans are not publicly available, its values
are calibrated based on a combination of data approximating its evolution and
the resulting match of simulated to the realized series of credit growth following
the procedure described in detail in Appendix A. It should be noted that DSTI
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ratio reflects the effect of every constraint (e.g. regulatory requirements) that
the bank might face and has an impact on credit supply, but is not explicitly
incorporated in the model. Thus, it can be regarded as effective DSTI. How-
ever, given that the volume of consumer credit is, in general, significantly lower
compared to other assets (i.e. mortgages) the effect of regulatory constraints is
expected to play a minor part8, while bank’s risk tolerance is expected to be
the major factor shaping the applied DSTI ratio.
2.3.4 Credit market
Solvent households (i.e. those who do service their loans) whose own income
and deposits do not allow them to satisfy their desired consumption ask for
consumer credit:
Laskh,t = C
d
h,t − (Ih,t +Dh,t−1) (8)
When considering granting a consumer loan the bank calculates the highest
affordable monthly payment by the potential borrower based on their income
and its own risk tolerance proxied by DSTI as follows:
LPmaxh,t = DSTIt · Ih,t (9)
Therefore, the maximum amount of credit that the bank will offer is:
Lmaxh,t =
LPmaxh,t · [1− (1 + rLt )−m]
rLt
−Bh,t (10)
where m is the maturity of the loan, measured in months, which is assumed
to be the same for all consumer loans.
As can be seen from Equation (10), the bank takes into account in its cal-
culation any outstanding debt (Bh,t) that the household might have. In which
case the bank consolidates the new with the pre-existing credit by extending
the latter’s maturity and charging the current interest rate, rLt , to the sum of
the two.
A final condition that the bank takes into consideration when extending
credit is the reserve ratio requirement. Under this condition, the bank can lend
up to (1−R) of its total deposits, with 0 < R < 1 denoting the reserve ratio.
Based on the figures of desired and offered credit, a household decides on
the loan size it will obtain according to the following rule:
Lh,t =
{
Lmaxh,t , L
ask
h,t ≥ Lmaxh,t
U(Laskh,t , L
max
h,t ), L
ask
h,t < L
max
h,t
(11)
Thus, if the credit offered by the bank is less than what is asked, the house-
hold borrows as much as possible. Alternatively, it borrows a random amount
8Indeed, the earliest regulatory application of DSTI limits is in late 2011 in few EU juris-
dictions, while in the majority of the cases where they are applied refer only to housing credit
(European Systemic Risk Board, 2018).
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from a uniform distribution between Laskh,t and L
max
h,t . Therefore, a household’s
outstanding debt evolves as:
Bh,t = Bh,t−1 + Lh,t (12)
with the associated monthly payment being:
LPh,t =
Bh,t · rLt
1− (1 + rLt )−m
(13)
It should be noted that all loans are of the fixed-payment type.
2.3.5 Labour market
The labour market is completely data-driven. Households’ income growth fol-
lows the specific path of the historical scenario applied. As a simplifying assump-
tion and in the absence of more specific data on income evolution, the scenario
implied growth rate is assumed to affect all households uniformly, regardless of
their position in the income distribution.9 In case unemployment rises by x%, a
randomly chosen set -of the appropriate size- of employed households becomes
unemployed and instead of its monthly income, receives an unemployment dole
from the government.10 If unemployment declines by x%, a randomly chosen
set -of the appropriate size- of unemployed households returns to employment
receiving a random monthly income between the unemployment benefit and the
median income of that period.
3 Simulation results
3.1 Input data
The injection of historical data into the ABM helps simplifying its structure
by fixing the effect of non-modelled agents to the actual scenario,11 while at
the same time allows to isolate and study the impact of few, selected variables.
An extra benefit of keeping the simulation close to real data is that model
validation goes beyond matching stylized facts to assessing how well the artificial
time series fit the historical ones. Thus, in the baseline specification where all
parameters are set to match the actual scenario, validating the model provides
a clear-cut test of the suitability of the implemented rules and interactions to
reproduce real-world phenomena.
9Therefore the results of this study can be seen as a benchmark in case income evolves
homogeneously across its distribution. Of course differential growth among income percentiles
is expected to reinforce (reduce) inequality and its effects, i.e. in case lower (upper) percentiles’
income declines faster or upper (lower) percentiles’ income increases more rapidly than their
distributional counterparts.
10Similarly to income growth, unemployment growth is assumed to affect households in a
random way, irrespective of their level of income.
11To the extent possible, conditional on data availability.
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Input data can be divided in two categories. The first includes those which
are updated at every time step during the simulation and represent the historical
scenario that the artificial economy follows. The second contains data which are
used to calibrate the ABM and are mainly used to initialize it, such as income
distribution parameters and the level of unemployment benefit. A special case
which traverses both categories is DSTI. Its evolution enters the simulation
exogenously but its initial values are calibrated to match the actual consumer
credit series.
3.1.1 Scenario data
The time step of the simulation corresponds to one month, hence monthly his-
torical data are used wherever possible. In case data at the desired frequency
are missing, the closest available (i.e. quarterly) is transformed to monthly by
cubic natural spline interpolation and used instead.
An important challenge encountered is the absence of publicly available,
monthly data on household net disposable income (NDI) for EU countries. The
highest available frequency is quarterly, provided by Eurostat. However, the
series which extended sufficiently back in the past (as early as 2001q1 for almost
all EU countries and even since 1995q1 for the majority of them) is discontinued
with the last recorded observation being in 2014q1.12 To overcome this issue,
data for wages & salaries are used as a proxy for NDI. Since the evolution of
the two series may not necessarily coincide, only the cases where they exhibit a
high degree of similarity are used as input in the subsequent simulation.
The comparison between available data on real NDI13 and real wages &
salaries reveals that the two series exhibit sufficiently similar patterns in four
EU countries. Figure 1 and Figure 2 display their evolution in levels and an-
nual growth rates respectively. It should be mentioned that nominal series are
converted to real ones using the GDP deflator.
12The respective series could be found in Eurostat’s dataset under the code ei naia q. It has
been discontinued and removed from dissemination as it was part of the old data collection
according to ESA95.
13The discontinued dataset on NDI covers 15 EU countries.
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Figure 1: Comparison between the levels of NDI and wages & salaries.
In order to facilitate comparison, original level data in Figure 1 are divided
by their sample means (yt/y
mean). As is evident, the series in all four countries
are adequately close. Some occasional mismatches are mostly associated with
the global financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath. In particular, in Slovenia
(SI) and Great Britain (UK) NDI dropped more sharply than wages & salaries,
while the opposite is true for Lithuania (LT). In Estonia (EE), the two series
move in a highly synchronized manner. These differences are expected to have
little impact on the results.
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Figure 2: Comparison between annual growth rates of NDI and wages & salaries.
The annual growth (%∆yoy) of NDI and wages & salaries in Figure 2 offers a
complementary view on the findings of Figure 1. Estonian data almost overlap
over the whole period whereas for Slovenia and Great Britain NDI’s decline
during the crisis was almost twice as deep compared to that of wages & salaries.
On the contrary, in Lithuania the latter decreased more than the former in
2009q1. A general pattern is that, apart from a short period after the crisis,
the two series undergo similar changes within every country. From an intra-
country perspective, Estonian and Lithuanian data (first row in both Figure 1
and Figure 2) exhibit a single dip located in late 2008 - early 2009 and recover or
at least stabilize after 2011, whereas Slovenian and British data display a second
period of negative growth around 2013. In Table 1 are reported three measures
which provide a quantitative assessment of the distance and the co-movement
between NDI and wages & salaries.
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Table 1: Distance and similarity measures between NDI and wages & salaries.
Country Transformation MAE RMSE Correlation
EE
yt/y
mean 0.045 0.056 0.948
%∆yoy 3.783 4.541 0.528
LT
yt/y
mean 0.040 0.050 0.948
%∆yoy 3.955 5.179 0.639
SI
yt/y
mean 0.026 0.033 0.926
%∆yoy 2.089 2.837 0.767
UK
yt/y
mean 0.022 0.027 0.925
%∆yoy 2.333 2.872 0.474
The measures used to estimate the distance between the two series are the
frequently employed Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and Root Mean Squared Er-
ror (RMSE). Moreover, their synchronicity is estimated using the (zero lag)
cross-correlation. Results indicate that, on average, the two series exhibit small
differences. Both in growth rates and levels (as a ratio of their historical av-
erage) their difference ranges from about 2% to 4%. In addition, they display
a high degree of synchronization. In levels, correlation is above 90% for every
country, while in growth rates the lower bound is around 50% for Estonia and
UK and above 75% for the case of Slovenia with Lithuania being in between.
Data for the average monthly unemployment rate, measured as a percent-
age of active population, are collected from Eurostat and directly used in the
simulation.
Interest rate related data are available from the European Central Bank’s
Statistical Data Warehouse (SDW) and in particular its Monetary & Financial
Institutions Interest Rate Statistics database. Consumer credit interest rates
are extracted from the respective series of credit for consumption and other
lending, with maturity over 1 and up to 5 years, while for deposits is used the
overnight interest rate for deposits from households and NPISH. Both series are
recorded as the average interest rate through each month and are reported in
percent per annum. Thus, the appropriate transformation is applied to convert
them to monthly interest rates.
3.1.2 Calibration data
The data used for calibration are mostly associated with the initial distribution
of income. These include minimum and average income as well as the Gini
coefficient of income distribution at the beginning of the simulation period. For
the latter, the UNU-WIDER World Income Inequality Database (WIID3.4) is
an excellent source with detailed information from a variety of providers and
14
with sufficient coverage both in time and from a cross-country perspective.
For the former two series are used proxies, both by Eurostat. As a proxy
for minimum income are used monthly minimum wages14, while average income
is approximated by mean monthly earnings extracted from the Structure of
Earnings Survey.15
3.1.3 DSTI data
The case of DSTI ratio is special because there is no precise information avail-
able for its level neither in micro nor in aggregate data. However, an alternative
is the BIS’s debt service ratios statistics database. This source provides in-
ternationally consistent, country-specific quarterly data which ”should correctly
capture how the [DSTI] in a particular country changes over time, even if it
does not necessarily accurately measure its level relative to what one could ob-
tain from the correct micro data” (Drehmann et al., 2015, p. 91). Although
this is an aggregate measure and likely different from the bank-level one based
on borrower basis as already recognized, in this study is assumed that the evo-
lution of the two is roughly similar and thus the former can be used to provide
an adequate approximation of the latter.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of DSTI ratio for households and NPISHs for
a sample of EU countries and the US.
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Figure 3: Evolution of DSTI ratio for households and NPISHs in a sample of
countries.
Figure 3 shows that the aggregate DSTI ratios in the plotted countries share
14Eurostat dataset code: earn mw cur
15Eurostat dataset code: earn ses monthly
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a common evolution. A rapid growth roughly until the end of 2008, followed by
a decline with diverse degrees of severity.
Apart from the UK for which there are available data on DSTI, the selec-
tion of the remaining DSTI series to calibrate and match with the Estonian,
Lithuanian and Slovenian historical macroeconomic scenario is based on the as-
sumption that economic conditions in these countries resembled those in their
larger European counterparts. Therefore, this should be reflected on an ap-
proximately comparable evolution of DSTI ratios.16 Data for the US are also
included because, as can be seen in Figure 3, its DSTI shares a similar pattern
with that of several European economies.
The calibration procedure is described in detail in Appendix A and consists
of a grid-search to find which pair of {initial DSTI, DSTI path} minimizes the
distance between the artificial and actual series of consumption and credit.
3.2 Empirical validation
In the empirical validation of the model its output is examined under a baseline
setup where all variables and their paths are set according to a country-specific,
historical scenario. The ultimate goal is to test its ability to produce close to
real-world patterns and thus establish confidence in its results and use for policy
simulations.
It should be emphasized that the degree of similarity between the imple-
mented country-specific scenario and the real-world one is of paramount impor-
tance for the validation exercise. In that respect, the applied macroeconomic
scenario for income and unemployment’s evolution can be regarded to repli-
cate the realized one in a sufficient manner, even under the assumption of that
evolution being uniform across income distribution as described in subsection
2.3.5. However, the results from the DSTI calibration procedure described in
Appendix A indicate that only in two countries (SI and UK) the calibrated
DSTIs can satisfactorily reproduce the historical evolution of consumer credit.
This suggests that the identified DSTI paths for these two cases are, potentially,
a decent match of the actual ones. Therefore, for the validation exercise and
the subsequent simulation experiments where DSTI is evolving through time the
focus will be only on these two countries (SI and UK). The validation results
for the other cases are reported in Appendix B, while for the simulations where
DSTI is held fixed at a certain value, every country scenario is considered.
Income distribution parameters and scenario related variables are initialized
according to the historical data as of January 200017 which is the chosen origin
of the simulation. The initial setup of the simulations is provided in Table 2
and Table 7.
16Of course country-specific factors are expected to affect the actual path of DSTI. Another
source of divergence is the different evolution between consumer credit and mortgage DSTIs
(see discussion in Appendix A for a detailed example). Thus, the final outcome depends on
the degree of similarity between the actual and available data.
17Or the closest date available.
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Table 2: Initial setup of the simulation for SI and UK.
Description Country
SI UK
Average income 1000 2430
Minimum income 350 950
Gini coefficient of income distribution (%) 23 35
Income distribution shape parameter (α) 3.095 0.822
Income distribution scale parameter (λ) 210 1800
Unemployment rate (%) 7.1 5.8
Consumer credit interest rate (%) 5.257 9.904
Overnight deposit interest rate (%) 0.348 2.621
DSTI (%) 50 56
After a burn-in period of N = 170 time steps, the country-specific historical
scenario is input to the model. A description of the series used and their time
periods is provided in Table 3 and Table 8.
Table 3: The range of the variables used in SI and UK historical scenarios.
Variable SI UK
Wages & salaries 2000q1 - 2018q1 2000q1 - 2018q1
Unemployment rate 2000m1 - 2018m3 2000m1 - 2018m3
Consumer credit interest rate 2005m5 - 2018m3 2004m1 - 2018m3
Overnight deposit interest rate 2005m5 - 2018m3 2004m1 - 2018m3
DSTI path US UK
The quarterly series for wages & salaries are deflated using the GDP deflator
and are converted to monthly frequency by spline interpolation. The processed
wage series as well as unemployment rate are transformed into monthly growth
rates. The missing data for interest rates for the first 3 to 5 years depending on
country, are approximated with the average of the first 12 non-missing observa-
tions of each series. Finally, the DSTI path associated with each macroeconomic
scenario is identified through the calibration process described in Appendix A.
17
Besides scenario and initialization data which are country-specific, a set of
parameters associated with agents’ behaviour as well as to the model’s setup is
fixed across simulations and reported in Table 4.
Table 4: Fixed parameter values.
Description Parameter Value
Number of households H 1000
Burn-in period N 170
Propensity to consume out of income αy 0.65
Propensity to consume out of deposits αw 0.05
WTR expectations extrapolation factor ωwtr 0.4
STR expectations extrapolation factor ωstr 1.3
ADA expectations parameter ωada 0.65
Households’ memory strength η 0.7
Households’ expectations rule persistence δ 0.9
Households’ intensity of choice β 0.4
Loan maturity (in months) m 60
Reserve ratio R 0.1
Propensities to consume (αy and αw) are set to values commonly used by the
literature (Godley and Lavoie, 2016; Assenza et al., 2015; Meijers et al., 2018,
among others), while the HSM-related parameters are specified according to
the figures identified by Anufriev and Hommes (2012a,b). The unemployment
dole, coinciding with the subsistence consumption level, is assumed to be 80%
of minimum income at each step of the simulation.
Each simulation is executed 100 times and the final results are summarized
by the median over all runs. Median is preferred instead of average in order
to avoid outlying values, especially when examining credit growth rates since
they may initially assume very small values, thus yielding extraordinarily large
growth rates. It should be mentioned that the comparison between artificial
and historical data is performed against the original frequency and range of the
latter. Hence, simulated data for consumption are summed over each quarter
and observations from the simulated series for credit that lie outside the range
of the actual data are discarded.
18
3.2.1 Validation with the Slovenian scenario
The results for the Slovenian scenario, plotted in Figure 4, exhibit a decent
match between artificial and historical data.
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Figure 4: Baseline simulation results for the SI-specific scenario.
Firstly, simulated consumption displays a remarkable degree of similarity
in terms of distance and synchronicity with the historical series. Moreover,
simulated consumer credit data exhibit a high degree of resemblance to the
evolution and magnitude of the historical series. This is indicated by the fact
that, in addition to the median simulation being fairly close to the actual data,
the latter lie between the first and third quartile (P25/P75) bands of the former
for a large part of the simulation horizon. The divergence originates in 2013
when the artificial series begin to rise (Figure 4, bottom left pane), while the
historical ones continue to decline up to 2016. This is associated with the
financial difficulties faced by the domestic banking system at the time (Bank
of Slovenia, 2013) resulting in a negative growth of consumer loans which only
”moved into positive territory after six years [in 2016].” (Bank of Slovenia, 2016,
p.44). Therefore, during this period, the assumed DSTI path used in the model
is most likely more benign from what occurred in reality. However, after early
2017 the two series resume their co-movement indicating that from then on the
assumed DSTI path is again an adequate approximation of the actual one.
The quantitative measures reported in Table 5 provide additional informa-
19
tion on the findings of Figure 4.
Table 5: Distance and similarity measures between simulated and historical
data for SI.
Variable Transformation MAE RMSE Correlation
Consumption
yt/y
mean 0.038 0.043 0.898
%∆yoy 1.801 2.270 0.710
Credit
yt/y
mean 0.148 0.200 0.711
%∆yoy 6.222 7.375 0.708
The distance between artificial and observed consumption is around 2% in
growth rates and about 4% in rescaled levels. At the same time, correlation
is high and ranges from 70% to almost 90%. An important finding is that
simulated consumer credit growth exhibits an average distance of 6% to 7%
from the historical one while correlation remains at sufficiently high levels of
about 70%.
3.2.2 Validation with the UK scenario
The next scenario considered for validation purposes is the UK-specific one.
Data for DSTI’s path are available for this country18, which results in the closest
emulation of consumer credit evolution generated by the model. The output is
presented in Figure 5.
18Given the caveats discussed before, such as the essentially unknown levels of DSTI and
potential differences between overall and consumer credit DSTI.
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Figure 5: Baseline simulation results for the UK-specific scenario.
As seen in Figure 5, apart from simulated consumption series which show
the, common among all scenarios (see also results in Appendix B), noteworthy
similarity to the actual ones, simulated consumer credit exhibits the highest de-
gree of closeness to the historical series from all scenarios examined. First and
third quartile bands envelop the actual data for almost the entire simulation
horizon both in levels and in growth rates. An obvious exception is observed to-
wards the end of the simulation, approximately after early 2016, when simulated
series begin to flatten and growth rates to decline whereas the actual ones show
an upward trend (with the respective growth rates being on positive ground).
It should be mentioned that to avoid distortions related to very low figures in
the beginning of the simulation horizon, observations prior to December 2002
are discarded from the analysis.
Table 6 shows in a quantitative way the good fit between the artificial and
historical series.
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Table 6: Distance and similarity measures between simulated and historical
data for UK.
Variable Transformation MAE RMSE Correlation
Consumption
yt/y
mean 0.034 0.037 0.901
%∆yoy 1.191 1.621 0.606
Credit
yt/y
mean 0.167 0.193 0.918
%∆yoy 4.774 5.929 0.538
As expected, the results in Table 6 are the best among all scenarios exam-
ined. Simulated consumption displays the minimum distance and high correla-
tion with actual data. Despite the fact that correlation between artificial and
observed growth rates is relatively low compared to the other cases, it is still
at the satisfactory level of about 60% while at the same time both MAE and
RMSE are below 2%. Results on consumer credit show a similar pattern; an
average correlation accompanied by the lowest distance in growth rates and the
highest correlation with comparable distance measures in rescaled levels.
Overall the validation exercise revealed three common patterns among all
scenarios; first, there is a remarkably good fit between artificial and actual data
on consumption. This indicates that the implemented consumption rule com-
bined with data on disposable income can provide an appropriate approxima-
tion of aggregate consumption. Second, Q1/Q3 bands around median simulated
consumption are very narrow. Since the stochastic element associated with con-
sumption comes from consumer credit, this indicates that the latter is a small
fraction of consumption. Finally, simulated consumer credit is adequately close
to the observed data where available data for DSTI are a good approximation
of the realized series. This enhances trust in the validity of the model to ap-
propriately capture the underlying credit supply mechanism and reproduce its
dynamics once reliable data are used as input.
3.3 The role of expectations on credit demand
A key element of the ABM under development is the implementation of the
HSM for agents’ expectations. The vast majority of macroeconomic ABMs is
mainly endowing their agents with a single or, in some cases, two expectations
heuristics. The most frequently used choices include naive expectations (yet =
yt−1), an adaptive rule similar to that in Equation 4 or some form of trend-
extrapolative rule analogous to Equation 2. Other choices range from regressive
techniques to rational expectations. The interested reader is referred to the
excellent work of Franke and Westerhoff (2017) and references therein for a
survey of modelling of animal spirits.
The only, to the best of the author’s knowledge, macroeconomic ABM where
22
the HSM is used, is by Dosi et al. (2017) where the authors find that expectations
do not have a large effect on the dynamics of the economy.
However, credit demand in the present model depends heavily on income
expectations and is essentially determined by households’ forecast errors; op-
timistic households whose actual income is less than expected will likely ask
for credit; on the contrary, pessimistic households will consume less, save more
and deleverage. Therefore, given the central role that expectations play in the
model, their effect on credit dynamics will be further examined.
All initialization parameters are set as reported in Table 2 with the exception
of DSTI which is kept fixed at 100% over the whole simulation. This large
value is chosen in order to enable the bank to accommodate practically any
credit request, even if the associated monthly payment equals the borrower’s
income. Using each individual expectations heuristic alone, plus all four of
them with the switching mechanism of the HSM, the evolution of credit for
each macroeconomic scenario is examined and presented in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Outstanding credit evolution for different expectations heuristics.
In Figure 6 is plotted the mean outstanding credit in every time step over 100
simulations by expectations heuristic. The first observation is that, although
credit growth rates are close for every heuristic -for a given country scenario- as
demonstrated by the roughly similar patterns, the levels are markedly different.
As one would anticipate, STR (red, solid line) is associated with more optimistic
forecasts resulting in higher credit levels. The LAA rule (green, dash-dotted
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line), being a trend extrapolation one, also generates increased credit demand
but not as high as the STR rule. Interestingly, mean19 outstanding credit is
absent in the cases of WTR and ADA rules. This indicates that under these
rules income expectations are very close to the realized figures or they are down-
wards biased. In the former case, the desired consumption demand from any
small, optimistic income forecast can be met by deposit withdrawal. In case
expectations are downwards biased, the actual income suffices to satisfy desired
consumption therefore credit is not needed. Finally, the HSM being a changing
mixture of all four rules, results in levels of credit which are influenced by the
dominating heuristic and in any case lie between the polar cases of STR and
WTR (or ADA). This is more evident in the case of the UK scenario20 where
the simulation indicates that the LAA rule is heavily dominating, hence the
results of the HSM are very close to the LAA’s.
The differential effect of expectations heuristics on the level of credit raises
the question whether this could also affect the size and evolution of non-performing
loans ratio (NPL21). The results for NPLs are extracted from the previous sim-
ulations for the heuristics that did lead to credit growth (STR, LAA and the
HSM) and are plotted in Figure 7.
19Results are the same even up to the 75th percentile of all simulation runs.
20Including initialization parameters. This is due to the fact that forecast errors for variables
with sizable values in absolute terms (such as the average and minimum income related to the
UK scenario) will be also large, thus influencing heuristic selection.
21NPL ratio is defined as the share of loans which are past due by 6 or more consecutive
months to total outstanding credit.
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Figure 7: Non-performing loans (≥ 180 days past due) ratio evolution for dif-
ferent expectations heuristics.
Figure 7 shows that average NPL evolution and size is almost identical among
heuristics in three out of four cases. The exception is the UK-specific scenario
where under the LAA rule average NPLs start to rise with an approximate 2-
year lag compared to the STR rule and the HSM. Apart from this discrepancy,
the size as well as the evolution is comparable among all expectations heuristics.
The previous analysis suggests that expectations heuristics have differential
and significant impact on the levels of provided credit, with some even resulting
in its complete absence. Nevertheless, differences among those which do result in
credit demand are not substantial neither in its growth rate nor in the size and
evolution of NPLs. Consequently, taking also into account the experimental
evidence by the respective literature, the HSM will be used throughout this
study.
3.4 Inequality, credit supply and macro-financial develop-
ments
In this part of the study the model is used to conduct several experiments to
examine the impact of income inequality and credit supply -proxied by DSTI-
on aggregate consumption, outstanding credit and bank NPLs. To do that two
modifications on the baseline scenario are applied; the first leaves DSTI at it’s
original setup and examines the effect of different initial inequality levels; the
25
second fixes DSTI at certain values throughout the simulation and analyzes
the impact of different initial levels of income inequality. The results from the
experiments are discussed below.
3.4.1 Evolving DSTI
In the first experiment is examined the effect of initial income inequality on con-
sumption, credit and NPLs. The simulation is executed with the only difference
from the baseline settings being in the initial level of income inequality. For
various income distribution Gini coefficients spanning from approximately 22%
to about 38% the model is run 100 times using two of the scenarios examined (SI
and UK) and the results over the whole simulation horizon are averaged22 and
reported in Figure 8 to Figure 10. To facilitate comparison, results are bench-
marked against the figure at the highest level of inequality. Hence, the vertical
axis corresponds23 to %∆y∗λ = 100(
yλ
y∗
− 1), where y = {C,L}, yλ the value of
variable y at scale λ and y∗ is the benchmark value of variable y. The two hori-
zontal axes in the respective graphs denote the initial scale parameter, λ, of the
Γ(α, 1/λ) income distribution (bottom) or, equivalently, the corresponding Gini
coefficient (top). In addition, the regression lines %∆y∗λ = βy ·Gini+ constanty
are drawn and the estimated βy coefficients with the corresponding statistical
significance levels are reported.
The results for consumption are presented in Figure 8.
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Figure 8: The effect of income inequality on average consumption. The red ×
denotes the benchmark value.
Figure 8 exhibits a clear, negative relationship between income inequality
and average consumption for both scenarios. This is also manifested in the sta-
tistically significant coefficients of the respective regression lines which indicate
that a 1% decrease in Gini coefficient of income distribution results in an ap-
proximate 0.04% to 0.07% increase in average consumption, depending on the
22Specifically, it’s the whole period average of the average over the 100 runs.
23In the case of NPLs, the latter being already expressed as a ratio, the distance from the
benchmark is simply ∆y∗λ = yλ − y∗.
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scenario examined. The sign of the relationship is as expected. When income is
more equally distributed, then a larger number of households have more funds
available thus resulting in higher levels of consumption. On the contrary, when
income is more concentrated, consumption cannot be supported by the few at
the top of the distribution and therefore settles in lower average values. In the
next subsection is examined whether considerably looser credit supply can mit-
igate the detrimental effect of inequality on consumption. Moving to consumer
credit, Figure 9 reveals an interesting pattern.
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Figure 9: The effect of income inequality on average consumer credit. The red
× denotes the benchmark value.
As seen in Figure 9, income inequality does affect the average volume of
consumer credit. In particular, a 1% increase in the former (more precisely in
income distribution’s initial Gini coefficient) results in an approximate decrease
of the latter by 2.4% as suggested by the respective regressions.
This result deserves further discussion given that various studies suggest a
positive relationship between the two variables. The underlying rationale is
associated with credit demand triggerred by households’ desire to keep their
consumption close to some external (”keeping up with the Joneses”) or internal
reference (own past consumption or ”habit formation”) level. Several, closely
related, theories have been proposed to explain this behaviour such as the rele-
vant income hypothesis (Duesenberry, 1967), the theory of expenditure cascades
(Frank et al., 2014) or the need to sustain living standards by households at the
bottom part of income distribution (Atkinson and Morelli, 2011). The work
of Bazillier and He´ricourt (2017) provides and a very comprehensive survey of
the recent literature on the links between inequality, leverage and crises. Some-
thing that should be kept in mind is, however, that the aforementioned theories
assume that households’ access to credit is unrestricted by their income or risk.
An additional challenge is posed by the empirical study of the relationship
between inequality and household leverage. While the measure of credit implied
by the theories above is household credit -and in particular consumer credit- the
majority of empirical studies use some aggregate measure of credit in the econ-
omy, including that to firms, which might be unrelated to inequality. This could
27
affect the results, obscuring the potential underlying causal relationship. Even
in the best case where household credit comprising of mortgages and consumer
loans is considered, the different dynamics of the two components might have
substantial impact on the results obtained and their interpretation. Indeed,
data from Jorda` et al. (2015) show that the trends and levels of the two types of
credit are noticeably different in 17 countries24, resulting in a 20% difference as
a share of GDP around 2012. The possibly different mechanism associated with
housing credit as opposed to consumer credit might imply a different explana-
tion for credit growth than the need of low income households supporting their
living standards (Bazillier and He´ricourt, 2014). In fact, Coibion et al. (2014)
using household level data reject the ”keeping up with the Joneses” hypothesis,
i.e. the demand-side explanation of credit growth and find a negative relation
between inequality and household debt.
The pattern observed in Figure 9 is also associated with the supply-side of
credit. The mechanism works through the adequately high income being held
by a large number of households. This configuration results in more credit
being considered as affordable by the banking sector (i.e. supported by the
potential borrowers’ income) for a given DSTI25 and therefore being granted
once it is asked for, assuming that demand remains roughly the same under
different inequality regimes26. Another key driver of this result is households’
assumed consumption function in Equation 1. Since habit formation or com-
parison with some external reference level are not explicitly considered, desired
consumption -and by extension consumer credit demand- is driven by income
expectations. Nevertheless, once credit demand is expressed it is for the bank
to decide how much to lend according to its DSTI level. Hence, households
exceeding the bank’s risk tolerance will be rationed and credit supply effectively
limited. Finally, results for NPLs are shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10: The effect of income inequality on average NPLs. The red × denotes
the benchmark value.
24Especially in the period after early 2000s, which is the focus of the present study.
25And other supply-side related properties such as loan interest rates and maturities.
26Results from simulations which are available upon request suggest that indeed consumer
credit demand is invariable across different initial income inequality levels.
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Figure 10 suggests that the relationship between income inequality and av-
erage NPLs is weak at best or possibly non-existent. In the UK-specific scenario
(right graph in Figure 10), higher inequality is associated with higher NPLs, al-
though the magnitude of the relationship is small and its statistical significance
low. On the contrary, in the case of the SI-specific scenario NPLs seem to be
independent from the level of income inequality, something which is reflected
on the statistically insignificant (i.e. indistinguishable from zero) slope of the
respective regression line. The main reason behind this result is the volume of
consumer credit.
The volume of credit provided is primarily controlled by the interaction
between the expectations-based demand and the DSTI-constrained supply. In
general, the amount of consumer credit asked is small since income expectations
are never that extraordinarily far from the realized values to render households’
available financial resources inadequate to cover an important part of desired
consumption. In addition, DSTI limits the maximum monthly loan installment
of an indebted household at the level of 50% to 60% of its income, depending
on the scenario applied (see Table 3). Finally, the debt assumed by a household
stochastically ranges between the demanded and the maximum amount offered
(see Equation 11). Thus, it is more probable that it will be lower than the
upper value permitted by DSTI at any point in time. The interplay of these
mechanisms results in the respective monthly installments being a small fraction
of households’ income, hence facilitating loan servicing even if income declines
considerably. Therefore, the main driver of NPLs is unemployment, the latter
being the reason for substantial income reduction, rendering debt unserviceable.
The stochastic, income-independent nature of unemployment shocks results
in NPLs being unconnected with the levels of inequality. It is possible that
differential unemployment growth across the distribution of income might influ-
ence the result depending on the direction and the degree of unemployment’s
impact. In case unemployment rises more among households at the bottom of
income distribution than among those at the top, a stronger link between NPLs
and inequality -conditional on the severity of this increase- could be expected.
On the contrary, if the impact of unemployment is stronger among households
at the top of income distribution -who, in general, do not resort to borrowing to
meet their consumption needs- the relationship between NPLs and inequality
is expected to be weak at best. The scarcity of exact data on unemployment’s
evolution by income percentile does not allow for the development of a more
accurate historical scenario27, thus the baseline assumption of a uniform effect
of unemployment will be applied, bearing in mind the caveats discussed above.
It should be reminded that NPLs are defined as the share of loans past due
6 months to total loans. Obviously, if instead of the ratio is considered the level
27Data from the international labour organization on the distribution of unemployment by
education indicate that for Slovenia and the UK the largest share of unemployed persons
have intermediate level of education. This pattern holds since 2000 in the former and 2005
in the latter. Although education level might give an indication about the distribution of
unemployment by income, the three levels (basic, intermediate, advanced) considered make
for a quite coarse distributional division with no clearly defined boundaries.
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of non-performing loans the sign of the relationship is clearly negative. Lower
income inequality and its associated larger volumes of credit are more likely to
result in higher amounts of non-performing obligations. In that respect, NPLs
expressed as ratio is a more meaningful metric.
3.4.2 Fixed DSTI
In this experiment, besides the effect of initial income inequality, is also studied
the effect of different DSTIs on consumption, credit and NPLs. In particular,
DSTI ranges from 50% up to 80% and remains fixed throughout the simulation.
Moreover, for each DSTI level the model is run 100 times with different initial
income distribution Gini coefficients which span from about 22% to 38%. The
rest of the macroeconomic scenario remains at its baseline setup.
The average of every variable over the whole simulation per {DSTI, initial
Gini coefficient} pair is plotted in Figure 11 to Figure 13. The benchmark
against which the comparison is made, as well as the horizontal axes follow the
same conventions as in the previous experiment. The vertical axis represents
the various DSTI levels while the colour of each cell indicates their distance
from the associated zero-level.
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Figure 11: Average consumption per DSTI and initial income inequality level.
The red × denotes the benchmark value.
Results in Figure 11 display an interesting pattern. For low levels of income
inequality (Gini ≤ 25% to 27% approximately) average consumption is larger
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than the benchmark even for low levels of DSTI. This difference is more sizable
in economies with lower absolute levels of minimum and average income, fluctu-
ating around 4% as shown in the first row of Figure 11. As these distributional
parameters increase, the magnitude of the effect declines to 1% - 1.5% although
the general pattern remains the same. As one moves to higher levels of inequal-
ity, consumption does not seem to be substantially supported by looser credit
supply and settles to lower values. Finally, at the high inequality regions of the
graphs consumption is evidently lower for any DSTI level as indicated by the
more frequent cold-coloured patches in Figure 11.
Results for consumer credit are presented in Figure 12 and display a rather
expected structure.
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Figure 12: Average consumer credit per DSTI and initial income inequality
level. The red × denotes the benchmark value.
In general, for any level of initial income inequality, an increase in DSTI levels
is followed by an increase in the average volume of consumer credit. However,
results indicate that income inequality does affect credit provision, with the sign
of the relationship corroborating the findings of the previous experiment. For a
given DSTI, average consumer credit is higher for smaller Gini coefficients and
drops as the latter increases. It should be noted here that the considerably wide
range of results is due to the small value of the benchmark, generated under the
minimum DSTI examined.
Finally, the outcome of the experiment for NPLs is shown in Figure 13.
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Figure 13: Average NPLs per DSTI and initial income inequality level. The red
× denotes the benchmark value.
In line with the results of the experiment with evolving DSTI, Figure 13
suggests that there is no apparent link between the average level of NPLs and
income inequality for any DSTI level. Cold and warm-coloured patches are
alternating with no clear structure emerging within the range of DSTIs and
Gini coefficients examined.
4 Conclusions
This study examined the effect of income inequality on consumption, credit and
non-performing loans by the means of a simple, data-driven agent-based model.
For its development are used standard elements from the respective macroe-
conomic ABM literature, augmented with a heuristics switching model based
on the findings from experimental studies on expectations formation. Overall,
its structure is kept simple by replacing the actions of and interactions among
some agents with the historical evolution of the associated series. This simplic-
ity allows the model’s output to be a markedly close replication of the actual
data when input is accurate enough.
The good agreement of model’s validation output with historical data sug-
gests that, apart from studying the effects of income inequality, the model is
suitable for policy simulation purposes. Under the baseline specification it can
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be readily used to provide scenario analyses examining the impact of macropru-
dential regulations (e.g. DSTI or consumer loan maturity limits) on consump-
tion and credit growth, conditional on income and unemployment’s evolution.
The experimental simulations performed with the model indicate that, in the
long run, income inequality is negatively associated with both consumption and
the volume of consumer credit. The former result is as expected. A more equal
distribution of income implies that a larger number of households have more
purchasing power available thus being able to maintain higher consumption lev-
els. The latter result corroborates the findings of recent empirical studies which
find a negative relationship between inequality and household debt. An inter-
esting result is that the ratio of non-performing obligations as a share of total
consumer credit seems to be independent of inequality. This is the outcome of
the interplay between two mechanisms governing the volume of consumer credit;
an expectations-based demand and a DSTI-constrained supply. These mecha-
nisms result in serviceable debt levels even under significant income decreases
for any inequality level. Obviously, this result should not be linked with the
large volume of mortgages observed in many countries since the early 2000s and
the associated non-performing obligations which cannot be studied under the
current implementation of the model.
Future research aims at extending the model in several dimensions, while
maintaining its close link with the actual data. A first step will be to include
agents which in the current version are assumed to be exogenous such as firms or
a more elaborate banking sector reacting to central bank’s actions. Equipping
the model with more active agents will also permit a more detailed description
of various markets such as the labour market or the incorporation of additional
ones such as the housing market. These extensions will allow to study the
effect of implementing and the interactions among various economic policies
thus assisting policy makers in supporting and promoting societies’ well-being.
References
Allen, T. W. and Carroll, C. D. (2001). Individual learning about consumption.
Macroeconomic Dynamics, 5(02):255–271.
Amaral, P. (2017). Monetary policy and inequality. Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland Economic Commentary 2017-01.
Ampudia, M., Georgarakos, D., Slacalek, J., Tristani, O., Vermeulen, P., and
Violante, G. (2018). Monetary policy and household inequality. ECB Working
Paper, No. 2170.
Anufriev, M. and Hommes, C. (2012a). Evolution of market heuristics. The
Knowledge Engineering Review, 27(2):255–271.
Anufriev, M. and Hommes, C. (2012b). Evolutionary selection of individual
expectations and aggregate outcomes in asset pricing experiments. American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 4(4):35–64.
33
Assenza, T., Delli Gatti, D., and Grazzini, J. (2015). Emergent dynamics of
a macroeconomic agent based model with capital and credit. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control, 50:5–28.
Assenza, T., Heemeijer, P., Hommes, C. H., and Massaro, D. (2011). Individual
expectations and aggregate macro behavior. De Nederlandsche Bank Working
Paper No. 298.
Atkinson, A. B. and Morelli, S. (2011). Economic crises and inequality. Human
Development Report Office (HDRO), No. HDRP 2011-06.
Bandourian, R., McDonald, J., and Turley, R. (2002). A comparison of para-
metric models of income distribution across countries and over time. LIS
Working Paper Series, No. 305.
Bank of Slovenia (2013). Annual report. Technical report, Bank of Slovenia.
Bank of Slovenia (2016). Economic and financial developments, October. Tech-
nical report, Bank of Slovenia.
Bazillier, R. and He´ricourt, J. (2014). The circular relationship between inequal-
ity, leverage, and financial crises: Intertwined mechanisms and competing
evidence. Document de travail du CEPII, 1(22).
Bazillier, R. and He´ricourt, J. (2017). The circular relationship between inequal-
ity, leverage, and financial crises. Journal of Economic Surveys, 31(2):463–
496.
Bordo, M. D. and Meissner, C. M. (2012). Does inequality lead to a financial
crisis? Journal of International Money and Finance, 31(8):2147–2161.
Branch, W. A. (2004). The theory of rationally heterogeneous expectations:
Evidence from survey data on inflation expectations. The Economic Journal,
114(497):592–621.
Brock, W. A. and Hommes, C. H. (1997). A rational route to randomness.
Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, pages 1059–1095.
Brock, W. A. and Hommes, C. H. (1998). Heterogeneous beliefs and routes to
chaos in a simple asset pricing model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 22(8-9):1235–1274.
Caiani, A., Godin, A., Caverzasi, E., Gallegati, M., Kinsella, S., and Stiglitz,
J. E. (2016). Agent based-stock flow consistent macroeconomics: Towards a
benchmark model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 69:375–408.
Caiani, A., Russo, A., and Gallegati, M. (2017). Does inequality hamper innova-
tion and growth? An AB-SFC analysis. Journal of Evolutionary Economics,
pages 1–52.
34
Cardaci, A. and Saraceno, F. (2015). Inequality, financialisation and eco-
nomic crisis: An agent-based model. Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures
Economiques (OFCE).
Christen, M. and Morgan, R. M. (2005). Keeping up with the Joneses: Ana-
lyzing the effect of income inequality on consumer borrowing. Quantitative
Marketing and Economics, 3(2):145–173.
Coibion, O., Gorodnichenko, Y., Kudlyak, M., and Mondragon, J. (2014). Does
greater inequality lead to more household borrowing? New evidence from
household data. Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research
(No. w19850).
Colciago, A., Samarina, A., and de Haan, J. (2018). Central bank policies and
income and wealth inequality: A survey. De Nederlandsche Bank Working
Paper No. 594.
Dawid, H. and Delli Gatti, D. (2018). Agent-based macroeconomics. Handbook
of Computational Economics, 4:63–156.
De Grauwe, P. and Macchiarelli, C. (2015). Animal spirits and credit cycles.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 59:95–117.
Delli Gatti, D. and Desiderio, S. (2015). Monetary policy experiments in an
agent-based model with financial frictions. Journal of Economic Interaction
and Coordination, 10(2):265–286.
Delli Gatti, D., Desiderio, S., Gaffeo, E., Cirillo, P., and Gallegati, M. (2011).
Macroeconomics from the bottom-up, volume 1. Springer Science & Business
Media.
Diks, C. and Van Der Weide, R. (2005). Herding, a-synchronous updating
and heterogeneity in memory in a CBS. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 29(4):741–763.
Dosi, G., Fagiolo, G., Napoletano, M., and Roventini, A. (2013). Income distri-
bution, credit and fiscal policies in an agent-based keynesian model. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 37(8):1598–1625.
Dosi, G., Fagiolo, G., Napoletano, M., Roventini, A., and Treibich, T. (2015).
Fiscal and monetary policies in complex evolving economies. Journal of Eco-
nomic Dynamics and Control, 52:166–189.
Dosi, G., Napoletano, M., Roventini, A., Stiglitz, J. E., and Treibich, T. (2017).
Rational heuristics? Expectations and behaviors in evolving economies with
heterogeneous interacting agents. LEM Working Paper Series 2017/31,
Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies.
Dosi, G., Pereira, M. C., Roventini, A., and Virgillito, M. E. (2016). The effects
of labour market reforms upon unemployment and income inequalities: An
agent-based model. Socio-Economic Review.
35
Drehmann, M., Illes, A., Juselius, M., and Santos, M. (2015). How much income
is used for debt payments? A new database for debt service ratios. BIS
Quarterly Review, page 89.
Duesenberry, J. S. (1967). Income, saving, and the theory of consumer behavior,
volume 180. Oxford University Press.
European Systemic Risk Board (2018). A review of macroprudential policy in
the EU in 2017. Technical report, European Systemic Risk Board.
Fagiolo, G., Guerini, M., Lamperti, F., Moneta, A., and Roventini, A. (2017).
Validation of agent-based models in economics and finance. LEM Working
Paper Series.
Fagiolo, G., Moneta, A., and Windrum, P. (2007). A critical guide to empirical
validation of agent-based models in economics: Methodologies, procedures,
and open problems. Computational Economics, 30(3):195–226.
Fagiolo, G. and Roventini, A. (2017). Macroeconomic policy in dsge and agent-
based models redux: New developments and challenges ahead. Journal of
Artificial Societies & Social Simulation, 20(1).
Frank, R. H., Levine, A. S., and Dijk, O. (2014). Expenditure cascades. Review
of Behavioral Economics, 1(1-2):55–73.
Franke, R. and Westerhoff, F. (2017). Taking stock: A rigorous modelling of
animal spirits in macroeconomics. Journal of Economic Surveys, 31(5):1152–
1182.
Geanakoplos, J., Axtell, R., Farmer, D. J., Howitt, P., Conlee, B., Goldstein,
J., Hendrey, M., Palmer, N. M., and Yang, C.-Y. (2012). Getting at systemic
risk via an agent-based model of the housing market. American Economic
Review, 102(3):53–58.
Godley, W. and Lavoie, M. (2016). Monetary economics: An integrated approach
to credit, money, income, production and wealth. Springer.
Gualdi, S., Tarzia, M., Zamponi, F., and Bouchaud, J.-P. (2015). Tipping points
in macroeconomic agent-based models. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control, 50:29–61.
Gurgone, A., Iori, G., and Jafarey, S. (2018). The effects of interbank networks
on efficiency and stability in a macroeconomic agent-based model. Journal of
Economic Dynamics and Control.
Haldane, A. G. and Turrell, A. E. (2018). Drawing on different disciplines:
Macroeconomic agent-based models. Journal of Evolutionary Economics,
pages 1–28.
Hamill, L. and Gilbert, N. (2015). Agent-based modelling in economics. John
Wiley & Sons.
36
Haruvy, E., Lahav, Y., and Noussair, C. N. (2007). Traders’ expectations in as-
set markets: Experimental evidence. American Economic Review, 97(5):1901–
1920.
Hassan, S., Pavo´n, J., Antunes, L., and Gilbert, N. (2010). Injecting data
into agent-based simulation. In Simulating Interacting Agents and Social
Phenomena, pages 177–191. Springer.
Hommes, C., Huang, H., and Wang, D. (2005). A robust rational route to
randomness in a simple asset pricing model. Journal of Economic Dynamics
and Control, 29(6):1043–1072.
Hommes, C., Sonnemans, J., Tuinstra, J., and van de Velden, H. (2004). Co-
ordination of expectations in asset pricing experiments. Review of Financial
Studies, 18(3):955–980.
Hommes, C., Sonnemans, J., Tuinstra, J., and van de Velden, H. (2008). Ex-
pectations and bubbles in asset pricing experiments. Journal of Economic
Behavior & Organization, 67(1):116–133.
Iacoviello, M. (2008). Household debt and income inequality, 1963–2003. Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking, 40(5):929–965.
Jorda`, O`., Schularick, M., and Taylor, A. M. (2015). Betting the house. Journal
of International Economics, 96:S2–S18.
Kumhof, M., Rancie`re, R., and Winant, P. (2015). Inequality, leverage, and
crises. American Economic Review, 105(3):1217–45.
Mankiw, N. G., Reis, R., and Wolfers, J. (2003). Disagreement about inflation
expectations. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 18:209–248.
Meijers, H., Nomaler, O¨., and Verspagen, B. (2018). Demand, credit and
macroeconomic dynamics. a micro simulation model. Journal of Evolutionary
Economics, pages 1–28.
Modigliani, F. and Brumberg, R. (1954). Utility analysis and the consumption
function: An interpretation of cross-section data. Franco Modigliani, 1:388–
436.
Palagi, E., Napoletano, M., Roventini, A., and Gaffard, J.-L. (2017). Inequality,
redistributive policies and multiplier dynamics in an agent-based model with
credit rationing. Italian Economic Journal, 3(3):367–387.
Perugini, C., Ho¨lscher, J., and Collie, S. (2015). Inequality, credit and financial
crises. Cambridge Journal of Economics, 40(1):227–257.
Pfajfar, D. and Santoro, E. (2010). Heterogeneity learning and information
stickiness in inflation expectations. Journal of Economic Behavior & Orga-
nization, 75(3):426–444.
37
Pfajfar, D. and Zˇakelj, B. (2016). Inflation expectations and monetary policy de-
sign: Evidence from the laboratory. Macroeconomic Dynamics, 22(04):1035–
1075.
Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2003). Income inequality in the United States, 1913–
1998. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1):1–41.
Piketty, T. and Saez, E. (2006). The evolution of top incomes: A historical and
international perspective. American Economic Review, 96(2):200–205.
Riccetti, L., Russo, A., and Gallegati, M. (2015). An agent based decentral-
ized matching macroeconomic model. Journal of Economic Interaction and
Coordination, 10(2):305–332.
Ricetti, L., Russo, A., and Gallegati, M. (2013). Unemployment benefits and
financial leverage in an agent based macroeconomic model. Economics: The
Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal, 7(2013-42):1–44.
Russo, A., Riccetti, L., and Gallegati, M. (2016). Increasing inequality, con-
sumer credit and financial fragility in an agent based macroeconomic model.
Journal of Evolutionary Economics, 26(1):25–47.
Stonedahl, F. and Rand, W. (2014). When does simulated data match real data?
In Advances in Computational Social Science, pages 297–313. Springer.
A Calibration of initial DSTI and its evolution
The fact that exact information about the level of DSTI and its path is not
available poses a major challenge given the data-driven nature of the ABM under
development. Although consumption is not significantly affected (as suggested
by the narrow bands around simulated consumption series in Figure 4 and Figure
5), consumer credit strongly depends on DSTI levels (see e.g. Figure 12) and
its evolution through time. In this section is described an attempt to overcome
this issue by calibrating the level and path of DSTI using publicly available
information.
The only source which provides internationally consistent, country-specific
data on DSTI is the BIS’s debt service ratios statistics database. This dataset
has two desirable properties; its quarterly frequency is adequately high for trans-
forming it to a satisfactorily realistic monthly interpolation and there are sep-
arate series by borrower type, including households and NPISHs. One caveat
associated with the last property is that, even though the data refer to DSTI
for credit provided to households and NPISHs, there could be significant differ-
ences by credit type; i.e. housing and consumer credit. Indeed, the case of the
US where more detailed data exist from the Federal Reserve Board’s Financial
Obligations Ratios database presented in Figure 14 is illuminating.
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Figure 14: Household debt service payments and financial obligations as a per-
centage of disposable personal income for the US (seasonally adjusted).
As can be seen in Figure 14, up to approximately early-2002 the two com-
ponents of total DSTI share a roughly common evolution. However, from then
until 2008 their paths are strongly divergent with consumer credit DSTI de-
clining while mortgage DSTI showing a sharp upward trend. Since 2008 and
the emergence of the subprime crisis, mortgage DSTI decreases at a faster rate
compared to consumer credit’s and it currently seems to have stabilized around
it’s lowest figures reached in 2013. On the contrary, the latter shows a solid
recovery from its 2013 bottom and now is close to its 2000 levels. Another
important observation is that, for the most part, total DSTI’s pattern (plotted
in red, dash-dotted line in Figure 14) resembles more closely that of mortgage
DSTI’s. Thus, since in the BIS’s database DSTI refers to total credit, this might
result in discrepancies between simulated and historical data on consumer credit
when inserted into the model.
Apart from the specific path, another important missing element is the level
of DSTI. Data from the BIS ”should correctly capture how the DSTI in a par-
ticular country changes over time, even if it does not necessarily accurately
measure its level relative to what one could obtain from the correct micro data”
(Drehmann et al., 2015, p. 91). Since the issue of disentangling the two DSTI
components cannot be addressed, the subsequent procedure focuses on at least
approximating the level and path of DSTI and associate it with the country-
specific macroeconomic scenarios examined.
The calibration process consists of a grid-search over a range of initial DSTI
values combined with several growth rate paths for DSTI in order to find which
combination yields the minimum distance and maximum similarity between
simulated and actual series of consumer credit.
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The choice of initial DSTI range over which the grid-search is performed, is
guided by the figures applied by the respective authorities as regulatory con-
straints on European banks. A recent report by the European Systemic Risk
Board (European Systemic Risk Board, 2018) indicates that DSTI limits range
between 40% to 80% of households’ disposable income. These constraints mostly
apply for housing credit but there are several occasions where similar values are
considered for consumer credit. Therefore, a reasonable search range for ini-
tial DSTI values is between 40% to 60% considering that almost every DSTI
path applied increases from 2000 until 2008. A step of 2% is used since it is
fine enough to allow for a sufficiently dense examination while it is as coarse as
needed to keep computational burden manageable.
The DSTI growth rate paths are calculated from the BIS series, after trans-
forming them from quarterly into monthly frequency through cubic spline in-
terpolation. Apart from the case of UK where country-specific data are avail-
able, the choice for the rest countries is based on the assumption that they
should broadly exhibit a comparable evolution of DSTIs with their larger Euro-
pean counterparts due to roughly similar economic conditions. Thus, the DSTI
growth rate paths examined are those from Denmark (DK), Spain (ES), Finland
(FI), the Netherlands (NL), the UK (UK) and the US (US) plotted in Figure 3.
The last one is included because it shares a similar pattern with that of many
European economies.
The simulation is executed 100 times under the baseline parameter setup
for each pair of {initial DSTI, DSTI growth rate path} resulting in 726 pairs
per country. Next, the median of the rescaled levels and annual growth rates of
consumer credit over all runs per pair is compared with the respective historical
series. The measures for comparing the simulated with the observed data are
the commonly used Mean Absolute Error (MAE), Root Mean Squared Error
(RMSE)28 and zero-lag cross-correlation (Stonedahl and Rand, 2014). Finally,
the combination resulting in the minimum distance and maximum correlation is
selected and added to the respective country’s baseline macroeconomic scenario.
In case results are not conclusive, a balanced choice is made taking into account
performance in both rescaled levels and annual growth rates. In Figure 15 to
Figure 18 are plotted the distance and correlation measures following from the
described grid-search procedure.
28Also known as Manhattan and Euclidean distances respectively.
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Figure 15: Calibration of initial DSTI and DSTI growth rate path for EE. Panels
(a) to (c) correspond to the distance between simulated and historical consumer
credit series in rescaled levels and (d) to (f) to annual growth rates.
The results for case of EE in Figure 15 indicate that possibly none of the
DSTI paths examined is a good approximation of what actually occurred. On
the one hand the best fit in rescaled series is observed for low initial DSTI levels,
while the opposite holds for annual growth rates. One common feature seems to
be that the DK scenario exhibits the best performance in both cases. Therefore,
this is selected with the initial value set to 50% as trade-off between the two
transformations.
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Figure 16: Calibration of initial DSTI and DSTI growth rate path for LT. Panels
(a) to (c) correspond to the distance between simulated and historical consumer
credit series in rescaled levels and (d) to (f) to annual growth rates.
In the case of LT the calibration results exhibit a uniform pattern; in both
rescaled levels and annual growth rates distance is smaller for higher initial
DSTIs and stabilizes for DSTIinitial ≥ 50%. While all DSTI paths display
comparable performances, the DK one seems to perform slightly better. For
the choice of initial DSTI, the value of 52% is selected since results after that
do not substantially improve. One noticeable fact is that distance measures
are significantly larger in LT compared to other countries, especially in annual
growth rates (around 3 to 4 times higher). This suggests that, as in EE, also
in this case the applied DSTI paths are likely not a good approximation of the
realized series.
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Figure 17: Calibration of initial DSTI and DSTI growth rate path for SI. Panels
(a) to (c) correspond to the distance between simulated and historical consumer
credit series in rescaled levels and (d) to (f) to annual growth rates.
Results for SI in Figure 17 display two patterns. In rescaled levels perfor-
mance improves roughly up to DSTIinitial = 50% and then deteriorates, while
in growth rates it continues monotonically as initial DSTI increases (albeit at
a declining rate). The scenarios which seem to outperform the rest are the DK
and the US one with the latter being marginally better. Hence the initial level
of DSTI is set to 50% and the selected scenario is the US-specific. It should
be mentioned that anecdotal discussions with supervisors suggest that indeed
the path of the Slovenian banking system’s DSTI has an inverted U shape and
currently its levels are considerably lower compared to the pre-crisis status.
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Figure 18: Calibration of initial DSTI and DSTI growth rate path for UK.
Panels (a) to (c) correspond to the distance between simulated and historical
consumer credit series in rescaled levels and (d) to (f) to annual growth rates.
Finally, results for the UK indicate that indeed the country-specific DSTI
path from the BIS database provides the best fit, followed closely by the ES
and US scenarios with which it shares a quite similar pattern (see Figure 3).
Since the direction of improvement is the same for both rescaled and growth
rate series, the selected value for initial DSTI’s level is set to 56%.
B Validation with inadequate approximation of
DSTI
The results presented in section 3.2 demonstrated the ability of the model to
reproduce historical series once input data used are a good approximation of
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the realized ones. In this section is examined the model’s performance when
some of the utilized data diverge from the actual figures. In particular, are
presented the cases of EE and LT where the implemented DSTI is not a good
approximation of the historical one as discussed in Appendix A.
The initial values of the Estonian and Lithuanian simulation parameters are
presented in Table 7.
Table 7: Initial setup of the simulation for EE and LT.
Description Country
EE LT
Average income 282 265
Minimum income 90 110
Gini coefficient of income distribution (%) 36 35.5
Income distribution shape parameter (α) 1.280 0.816
Income distribution scale parameter (λ) 150 190
Unemployment rate (%) 12.9 15.9
Consumer credit interest rate (%) 6.738 4.948
Overnight deposit interest rate (%) 0.699 0.368
DSTI (%) 50 52
A description of the series used and their time periods is provided in Table
8.
Table 8: The range of the variables used in EE and LT historical scenarios.
Variable EE LT
Wages & salaries 2000q1 - 2018q1 2000q1 - 2018q1
Unemployment rate 2000m1 - 2018m3 2000m1 - 2018m3
Consumer credit interest rate 2005m1 - 2018m3 2005m3 - 2018m3
Overnight deposit interest rate 2003m3 - 2018m3 2005m3 - 2018m3
DSTI path DK DK
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B.1 Validation with the Estonian scenario
The results for the EE-specific scenario are plotted in Figure 19. The first
row presents the results for consumption and the second those for consumer
credit. Column-wise, the first column shows the results in levels (rescaled by
their sample means), while the last one in annual growth rates.
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Figure 19: Baseline simulation results for the EE-specific scenario.
As one can see in Figure 19, the simulated series for consumption are in very
good agreement with the historical ones both in levels, and in growth rates. On
the contrary, results for consumer credit are not as satisfactory. In Table 9 are
reported three quantitative measures of the distance between the artificial and
actual observations.
46
Table 9: Distance and similarity measures between simulated and historical
data for EE.
Variable Transformation MAE RMSE Correlation
Consumption
yt/y
mean 0.037 0.052 0.932
%∆yoy 3.012 4.101 0.767
Credit
yt/y
mean 0.182 0.208 0.684
%∆yoy 6.233 7.418 0.389
The quantitative measures in Table 9 corroborate the findings in Figure
19. They reveal a distance of approximately 3% to 4% on average and high
correlation (above 75% in growth rates and above 90% in levels) between the
actual and artificial series of consumption. For the case of credit though, results
are less encouraging with higher error measures but also substantially lower
correlation.
B.2 Validation with the Lithuanian scenario
The results for the Lithuanian scenario are more promising and are presented
in Figure 20.
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Figure 20: Baseline simulation results for the LT-specific scenario.
As in the case of EE, simulated data for consumption (first row of Figure
20) are almost indiscernible from the observed ones. Credit related series in the
second row of Figure 20 show that there is some degree of similarity in distance
and synchronicity between artificial and historical data. The patterns both in
levels and growth rates are comparable while in the latter even magnitudes are
close after 2010. In Table 10 are reported the quantitative measures of distance
and similarity between the two series.
Table 10: Distance and similarity measures between simulated and historical
data for LT.
Variable Transformation MAE RMSE Correlation
Consumption
yt/y
mean 0.042 0.053 0.960
%∆yoy 3.066 3.830 0.829
Credit
yt/y
mean 0.285 0.322 0.784
%∆yoy 18.645 27.015 0.862
Regarding consumption, the figures in Table 10 demonstrate that indeed
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there is a very good agreement between the two series both in magnitude (their
average distance is around 4% )as well as in co-movement (correlation ranges
between 80% and 96%). Results for credit series show a mixed picture. On the
one hand distance measures (MAE and RMSE) reveal large discrepancies which
are mainly driven by the period up to 2010. On the other hand, high correlation
indicates that the two series move in a strongly synchronized manner.
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